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The Obama administration reversed Bush policy and will now focus not on long-range missiles- which they judge to be a distant threat- to focus on the immediate concern for Europe of short to mid-range missiles launched from Iran. Does this constitute another Munich-sized betrayal of the Czechs- and the Poles- by another weak-armed Western ally? Does this make America unreliable and put into question the security of Czech borders?

Time will tell. Munich, of course, had immediate consequences. Chamberlain’s decision to appease Hitler opened all of Eastern Europe to harrowing occupation and the slaughtering of millions. The Obama appeasement- if in fact that is what it is- will not result in a renewed Russian occupation of the Czech Republic. Whether it increases Russian influence in the region depends more on how the region reacts than on the decision itself.

Obama’s move exhibits a worrying trend in US foreign affairs. The world, and Americans as well, used to be able to rely on US domestic politics ending at the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. No more. Stirred into boil by silly radio and cable vaudeville news channels such as FOX and MSNBC, the ugly, irrational, and purblind partisanship that now divides the country and its leaders threatens to reduce American’s predictability, and therefore credibility, in the world. That is eroding its position as a superpower far more quickly than its economic problems or the military quagmire in the Middle East ever could. The US should not expect the world to follow its lead when its internal debates- broadcast loudly around the world- are so juvenile, and result in temporary policies that are reversed when the public wakes up in a different mood.

On the other hand, Czechs should not question US commitment to the essential provision of NATO. Neither the American right or left is willing to sacrifice an ally, and, if the Czech Republic ever faces a military threat to its security, President Obama again underlined last week that the US will be the first ally to stand beside the Czechs to quell it. The Czechs can be disappointed that there is no base to serve as a physical reminder of that promise, but it has no cause to call its absence a betrayal.

The entire affair has exposed the differences in how the Czechs and the US view the world. The Czechs, for justified and historical reasons, worry about Russian tanks. The US views Russia as an old military adversary, a current economic rival, and a potential foreign policy partner. The Czechs would like to prevent a recurrence of the Cold War. The US would like to move past the Cold War so that it can focus on the potential collision of three Asian powers (China, Russia and India).

While the Czechs are questioning whether the US are reliable defenders of Europe, the US is worried about the growing influence of Russian economic and energy policy, which it believes is a far greater threat to Czech and European stability than the possible invasion by an army. The decay of Russian military might was exposed in Afghanistan and Georgia, and the flaws in Putin’s power structure were revealed when faced with crippling protests from mothers of maltreated soldiers. Russia is too wary of internal discord to pose much of a military threat to Europe. Besides, Putin has an equally effective button to push: it is now clear that Russia intends to impose its influence through the control of energy supply and distribution, and economic control of the political system.

The question of many both inside and outside the Czech Republic is how much the Czech government is doing to prevent such economic influence, or whether it accepts the old trade ties no matter what cost it may have to sovereignty. Some uglier voices both here and abroad go as far as to accuse the Czechs of demanding Nato protection from the Russians while its politicians enrich themselves by selling the country piece by piece to their former occupier. As evidence, these conspiracy theorists present the (unclear) ties between the Russian secret service and the big three financial houses operating here, and the disturbing news that the CEO of state-owned CEZ does not know who owns all the floated shares of his company, and declines to find out.

The radar was never going to stop the Russians from trying to regain what they believe to be theirs. It was not going to prevent them from squeezing Europe on energy, and attempting to influence politics through finance. Its absence does not reduce America’s commitment to Nato and its members. If both countries think rationally and reasonably, last week’s decision may benefit both. America could learn that it must have a more consistent, engaged and visible approach to Central Europe. The Czech Republic could understand that, while America still stands behind it, if its big fear is Russia, then the country must do what it can to keep Russian energy and economic politics outside its borders.

Weston Stacey, AmCham